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facts derived from the best available 
aggregate data to make his medical 
assertions. 7 Today's judges are 
requiring nothing more. So, prefer-
ence toward epidemiology is in no 
way against history; the history of any 
discipline is known only by the evo-
lution of its ideas. 
To address this issue via analogy: 
the FDA (and scientific community) 
requires clinical trials/ epidemiologi-
cal data in order to investigate drug 
efficacy without raising much cri-
tique . Why then should judges 
endure critique for requiring the 
same types of information when 
attributing etiology? 
Epidemiology will not always be 
the dominant tool to assess causa-
tion , but in many situations it is. 
Many of the authors ' critiques were 
directed towards situations where 
epidemiology would most likely be 
the preferred methodology to attrib-
ute etiology in the scientific commu-
nity. For instance, they brought up 
examples of chemical structure 
analysis, in vitro studies, and in vivo 
studies supporting causation com-
pared to "overwhelming epidemio-
logical evidence" negating it, then 
critiqued the preference toward the 
epidemiological data. The simple 
reason the epidemiological analysis 
is given more weight is because it is 
an observational method analyzing 
real humans with real exposure often 
with real controls (though not 
required), whereas the other study 
designs are extrapolating from lab 
environments or non-representative 
samples. Epidemiology is not always 
the best methodology, although it is 
often preferred when attempting to 
understand etiology. This is accepted 
within the scientific community and 
should be the case within the legal 
community as well. 
To clarify this situation we must 
7. Louis, & searches on Phthisis- Anatomical Patho-
wgical and Therapeutical, Walshe , ed. (London: The 
Sydenham Society, 1849) ; Louis and Trousseau, 
ANATOMICAL, PATHO LOGICAL AN D THERAPEUTI C 
REsEARCH E.S ON THE YELLO W FEVER, WHICH PRE-
VAILED IN G IBRALTAR IN 1828. , Trans. by Sha ttuck. 
(Boston: Charles C. Little &James Brown, 1829) ; 
Morabia, P. C. A. Louis and the Birth of Clinical Epi-
demiology, 49 J. C LI NICAL EPIDEMIO LOGY, 1327-1333 
(1996) . 
8. Bhopal, supra n. 6. 
also understand that epidemiology is 
intended to work in conjunction with 
other disciplines as indicated by the 
causal criteria of coherence with bio-
logical plausibility (inter-disciplinary 
plausibility) .8 It is common in the sci-
entific process to conduct case stud-
ies, chemical structure analyses, and 
animal studies as precursors to mas-
sive epidemiological studies aimed at 
definitively attributing causation. Epi-
demiology is not divided from other 
disciplines; it is merely another tool 
used to assess the distribution and 
causes of disease in populations. 
Bryant and Reinert specifically cri-
tiqued a district court's statement in a 
silicone breast implant case that said, 
"case reports and case studies are uni-
versally regarded as an insufficient 
scientific basis for a conclusion 
regarding causation because case 
reports lack controls"(p. 16) . There 
is absolutely nothing wrong with this 
statement in its context. Granted, 
some diseases may only be investi-
gated by case studies (although I am 
unaware of any); this is not so for the 
elusive breast implant syndrome. The 
reason judges correctly required con-
trols is because without a comparison 
group it is impossible to understand 
the effect of an exposure-there 
would be no way to know whether the 
morbidity/ mortality experienced by 
the study participants occurred natu-
rally, or as result of the exposure (sili-
cone, in this case). The comparison 
with representative un-exposed con-
trols allows a baseline morbidity/ mor-
tality rate from which an exposed 
group's morbidity/ mortality can be 
measured. This was especially needed 
in the breast implant suits because 
the alleged symptoms were non-spe-
cific and common in those with and 
without exposure to silicone. 
Courts are rightly interested in 
attributabl,e risk, not the proportion of 
morbidity/ mortality within a case 
series. The exposure of silicone gel 
was not rare and was readily assess-
able via epidemiological investiga-
tion-again justifying the court's 
request for research including con-
trols. Even if the exposure had been 
rare, case control methodology 
would have been preferred over case-
series when attributing causation, 
again because it implores controls. 
Case series are important research 
tools; however, they should be used 
to attribute causation only when it 
can be explained why other means of 
investigation are unavailable. 
**** 
Admittedly, isolated misuse of epi-
demiology has occurred in law (as 
referenced in Bryant and Reinert's 
article) and will undoubtedly occur 
again. On the other hand, "Struc-
tural misuse" of epidemiology in the 
courtroom is quite a claim, and I fail 
to see profound objective evidence 
in support of it. Also, analysis of epi-
demiology in the courtroom 
requires intricate knowledge of sta-
tistical terminology and methods of 
analysis; oversimplification/ misinter-
pretation of these concepts could be 
potentially harmful to judges, fur-
ther distorting the role of epidemiol-
ogy in the courtroom. i ri 
STEVEN JAMES KORZENIEWSKI 
is a graduate student in the College 
of Human Medicine, Department of 
Epidemiology, and the College of 
Communication Arts & Science, 
Health Communication, at Michigan 
State University. (stevek@epi .msu.edu) 
The authors respond 
We welcome Mr. Korzeniewski's 
efforts at clarifying some of the epi-
demiological concepts included in 
our original paper. If anything, how-
ever, his critique only reinforces our 
fundamental point: that some 
courts, by applying inflexible rules of 
admissibility, are missing the com-
plex and multi-disciplined dynamics 
underlying scientific assessments of 
causality. By so doing, these courts 
are preventing the factfinders from 
considering evidence that scientists 
would find relevant and even persua-
sive, thereby taking the legal system 
farther from rather than closer to 
the truth. 
In this respect, Mr. Korzeniewski's 
continued on page 144 
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that judges properly rely on their 
unanalyzed common sense, and most 
of his colleagues seem to concur. 
Grimm, though, offers an important 
caution. Agreeing with Badinter that 
political lassitude has transferred 
important dia logues from legisla-
tures to courts, Grimm observes that 
the transfer involves a translation as 
well-from general political dis-
course into legal discourse-and that 
legal discourse is thinner than politi-
cal discourse (p. 105). 
Readers will evaluate the content 
of the conversations differently. 
Some will be troubled by the judges' 
acceptance of their own activism. 
Others will find the judges' willing-
ness to intervene in the service of 
moral judgment admirable. All read-
ers interested in today's constitu-
tional courts will profit from eaves-
dropping on this conversation. 
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comments on statistical significance 
are illustrative. First, we all appar-
ently agree that courts should not 
exclude the testimony of an expert 
simply because it is informed, in 
part, by epidemiological studies that 
are not "statistically significant." Mr. 
Korzeniewski may disagree with our 
empirical assessment of what courts 
actually are doing, but we will not 
burden the reader with a further 
attempt to establish that point here. 
More importantly, however, we 
think Mr. Korzeniewski misconceives 
our essential critique about the use of 
the term "statistical significance." We, 
along with many epidemiologists, 
find fault with it not because the 
information derived from signifi-
cance testing is useless, but because 
the term is used as a black box that 
obscures the choices one makes in 
arriving at the final conclusion of sig-
nificance/ insignificance. In particu-
lar, it obscures the choice of which 
alpha level to use , and why to use, for 
instance, 0.05 as the cut off instead of 
0.10 or 0.01.' Mr. Korzeniewski states 
that courts are correct to use 0.05 or 
0.01 as an alpha level because that is 
what scientists have traditionally used, 
but this assertion is itself subject to 
dispute.2 In any event, our point is 
simply that, whichever alpha level is 
chosen, it should be part of the analy-
sis of whether evidence is admissible, 
and should not end the inquiry. 
With respect to Mr. Korzeniewski 's 
point regarding confidence inter-
vals, the substance of our critique 
was not that confidence intervals can-
not be used for significance testing, 
but that they should not be used only 
for significance testing. As Mr. Korze-
niewski exhaustively illustrates, confi-
dence intervals reveal much more 
about a potential causal relationship 
than simply the result of significance 
testing. It is precisely this "context," 
which Mr. Korzeniewski puts high 
value on, that is sacrificed when a 
court mechanically applies signifi-
cance testing to scientific evidence. 
In the courts, it is not a question of 
wh ether some evidence sh ould be 
given more weight than others; it is a 
question of whether some evidence 
will be heard at all ifit does not meet 
arbitrary standards of admissibili ty. 
Finally, we agree with Mr. Korze-
niewski that epidemiological studies 
are remarkably powerful and useful 
means of evaluating causation . And 
to the extent that such studies are 
sound and relevant, they should be 
admissible, along with other rele-
vant evidence. The question often 
faced by courts, however, is what to 
do when no such studies exist, or 
when such studies are in conflict 
with each other or with other 
sources of information. It is our con-
tention that in these situations some 
courts increasingly have made 
choices that function to deprive the 
factfinder of data which scientists 
such as Mr. Korzeniewski would find 
relevant to the causal inquiry. In this 
respect, the critique's analogy to the 
FDA does not support its argument 
on balance. While there is some par-
allel between some courts' use of 
epidemiology and the FDA's 
requirement of clinical trials before 
new pharmaceuticals are intro-
duced, it is well recognized that reg-
ulatory agencies like the FDA and 
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EPA often make decisions about 
toxicity based on data that courts 
would consider unreliable to sup-
port causation . In fact, in toxic tort 
cases, plaintiffs sometimes seek to 
use the FDA or EPA's regulation of a 
particular substance as evidence of 
that substance's toxic ity. This is 
often unsuccessful. 3 In this respect, 
Mr. Korzeniewski is simply wrong 
when he suggests that the approach 
used by courts is consistent with 
how the FDA makes decisions about 
causation. 
To sum up, we agree with many of 
the critique's clarifications of the epi-
demiological concepts discussed in 
our original paper. And we agree 
with the critique's implicit argument 
that it is permissible for courts to 
value some evidence more highly 
than other evidence. However, courts 
should not, when evaluating the 
admissibili ty of evidence, deprive the 
factfinder of evidence that scientists 
would rely upon in making causal 
determinations. Nothing contained 
in Mr. Korzeniewski's critique under-
mines this fundamental point. i 1i 
Arthur H. Bryant 
and Alexander A. Reinert 
1. To the extent that Mr. Korzcnicwski suggests 
that a sentence of our original paper conflated 
the "p-value '" and the alpha leve l, this was certainly 
unintentional , and we apprec iate his clarification 
here. For the most part, however, we attempted to 
keep the two concepts analytically distinct, and 
saw no need to refer specifically to the alpha level 
by its technical term. 
2. For an illustrative critique, see Kadas v. MCI 
Systemhouse Co,p., 255 F.3d 359, 362-63 (7th Cir. 
200 I ) ( Posner, J.) . 
3. See, e.g., Rider v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 
295 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11 th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
FDA's "risk-utility analysis involves a much lower 
standard than that wh ich is demanded by a court 
of law"). 
